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Abstract 
Finding suitable settlements to civil wars, then proceeding to reconcile and reintegrate civilian 
communities to realize such settlements and avoid future conflict, poses many seemingly 
insurmountable challenges. The Syrian conflict is a case in point. Not only has a settlement 
proved elusive, but little is known about how the millions of civilian refugees who have fled the 
war feel about postconflict reconciliation and the future of their country. We use an original 
survey of 1,384 Syrian refugees conducted in Turkey in 2016 to draw attention to how refugees 
view the politics of postconflict reconciliation and reconstruction. We find that refugees desire 
peace in Syria more than anything else, yet they also desire harsh punishments for the 
perpetrators of violence, especially against civilians, from all sides of the conflict, which is likely 
to complicate any process of reconciliation. 
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Despite the lack of strong data concerning how Syrian refugees feel about postconflict 
reconciliation, representatives from different sides in the conflict have repeatedly referred to the 
Syrian people as the ultimate authority on charting a way forward for the war-torn country. 
When asked about President Bashar al-Assad’s future role in Syria, former U.S. Secretary of 
State Rex Tillerson declared it would have to be decided by the Syrian people.1 Similar 
statements have been made by virtually all parties to the conflict, from the Syrian regime and 
opposition groups to the external actors involved, including Russia, Turkey, and Iran. For 
example, in a live interview broadcast on the Turkish television network Star on October 7, 
2015, the then Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was asked to address the possibility of 
a transitional, negotiated settlement that would leave Assad in power. Davutoğlu’s remarks on 
                                                 
1 “Tillerson says Assad’s fate to be decided by Syrian people,” Reuters, last modified March 30, 2017, 
https://in.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-usa-tillerson/tillerson-says-assads-fate-to-be-decided-by-syrian-
people-idINKBN1711QL. 
 this topic illustrate the importance of understanding Syrian refugees’ attitudes about postconflict 
reconciliation and especially how exposure to violence has shaped these attitudes: 
 
Even if we accepted a transition with Assad, would the Syrian people approve 
of it? Would the people [refugees] that I spoke with on Wednesday or those 
currently living in camps accept or believe in a transition with Assad? Will they 
believe that a person who showers them with bombs will bring peace? Will they 
believe that a person who uses chemical weapons will bring peace? All this talk 
about a transition with Assad is easily said on paper and behind closed doors 
in luxurious negotiation rooms. . . . But who are you going to convince? . . .  
Put yourself in these people’s shoes. The person who killed him [sic], destroyed 
their home, and used chemical [weapons] still occupies Damascus, and the global 
community is telling you, “Return while he is still there.” Would you return? 
 
Although geopolitical realities and Turkish domestic politics have shifted considerably since 
Davutoğlu made his statement, the experiences of Syrian refugees have not. Indeed, the human 
costs of the war have only gotten worse: an estimated 475,000 people have died, and close to 14 
million Syrians have been wounded or displaced.2 Among those displaced, more than 5 million 
had to leave Syria as refugees.3 As our research and that of others reveal, a substantial portion of 
Syrian refugees were exposed to violence in numerous forms.  
In this article, we use an original survey of 1,384 Syrian refugees that we conducted in 
Turkey in 2016 to draw attention to how refugees view the politics of postconflict reconciliation 
and reconstruction. In the survey, our research team asked questions related to a number of 
themes, including exposure to violence in Syria, patterns and motives for leaving, access to 
services, daily life in Turkey, attitudes toward various participants in the conflict, and beliefs 
about peace and reconciliation in a postconflict Syria. One of the primary motivations of our 
work is to give a voice to ordinary Syrians whose opinions and beliefs largely remain unheard, 
especially with respect to the future of their home country.   
Ignoring these voices has the potential to prolong the conflict and decrease the likelihood 
of a lasting peace. Scholars have found that postconflict processes that take public opinion into 
account are more likely to lead to reconciliation and durable peace.4 By contrast, failure to 
consider the attitudes of the victims of conflict increases the likelihood that grievances will go 
unaddressed and that conflict will recur in the near future.5 Furthermore, when public 
perceptions and attitudes about fairness and justice are ignored, trust in institutions can be eroded 
even further, making order all the more difficult to establish. In contrast to earlier research in 
which scholars had the opportunity to study civilian attitudes about justice long after the fighting 
                                                 
2 “About 475 thousand persons were killed in 76 months of the Syrian revolution and more than 14 million were 
wounded and displaced,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, last modified July 16, 2017, 
http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=70012. 
3 “Syria emergency,” UNHCR, accessed July 31, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.html. 
4 Howard Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice: Revised and Updated (New York: Good Books, 2015); 
Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
5 Cyanne Loyle and Benjamin Appel, “Conflict Recurrence and Postconflict Justice: Addressing Motivations and 
Opportunities for Sustainable Peace,” International Studies Quarterly 61, Issue 3 (September 2017): 690-703. 
 ended,6 our survey examines the attitudes of displaced victims of an ongoing civil war. These 
attitudes are important: previous research has shown that refugee populations can play a critical 
role in peace building by either supporting ceasefires and peaceful settlements of conflict or 
siding with warring groups and continued fighting.7 It is therefore critical to establishing lasting 
peace that reconciliation processes are designed to cover a diverse set of voices, including 
displaced civilian victims of conflict.   
After providing some context and outlining our study, we describe the preferences of the 
Syrians to whom we spoke in an effort to examine the tensions that make the politics of 
negotiation and postconflict reconciliation so difficult. We found that although the overwhelming 
majority of our respondents desired peace and wanted Syria to remain a unified state, a very 
sizable group also expressed an unwillingness to live with those who supported the regime 
and/or anyone who directly partook in violence against civilians. Traumatized civilians come to 
dislike all groups associated with violence, regardless of which side they were on, and yet these 
armed groups are almost always those tasked with negotiating the peace. Our findings suggest 
that relying exclusively or primarily on the perpetrators of violence to negotiate peace may create 
serious political barriers to postconflict reconciliation. This is because civilians are prone to view 
the perpetrators of violence with particular vengeance and distrust, thereby inhibiting collective 
processes of forgiveness, reintegration, and reconciliation.  
 
The Syrian Civil War and Syrian Refugees in Turkey 
 
The respondents we interviewed in our study were all refugees from the Syrian Civil War 
residing in Turkey. The civil war was initially sparked by protests that began in March 2011, 
when children ages 9 to 15 were detained and reportedly tortured for writing graffiti denouncing 
the Assad regime on the walls of their school in Der’a.8 On March 15, during demonstrations 
calling for the children’s release, four people were shot dead by the security forces, causing 
demonstrations to escalate. Protests soon spread to other cities, such as Hama and Homs, and 
were met with a harsh response from the regime.9 In early April, Assad introduced a number of 
minor reforms in hope of quelling the growing unrest: He replaced the governor of Der’a; lifted 
the Emergency Law, which had been in effect since 1963; and gave citizenship to some 300,000 
Syrian Kurds.10 These reforms proved insufficient, and by the end of July 2011, around 2,000 
people were reported to have died as result of mounting violence.11 Also in July of that year, a 
number of Syrian Army officers deserted to form the Free Syrian Army (FSA). This significant 
development in the organization of the opposition was followed in October 2011 by the 
                                                 
6 For an example based on a 2008 survey of attitudes in Spain toward transitional justice for victim of the Spanish 
civil war and Francoist dictatorship, see Paloma Aguilar, Laia Balcells, and Hector Cebolla-Boado, “Determinants 
of Attitudes Toward Transitional Justice: An Empirical Analysis of the Spanish Case,” Comparative Political 
Studies 44, issue 10 (May 2011): 1397-1430. 
7 Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” International 
Organization 60, no. 2 (April 2006): 335-366; Idean Salehyan, “Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as 
Sanctuary for Rebel Groups,” World Politics 59, Issue 2 (January 2007): 217-242; Idean Salehyan, Rebels without 
Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). 
8 John McHugo, Syria: From the Great War to Civil War (London: Saqi Books, 2014). 
9 Emile Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant (London: Routledge, 2013). 
10 “Syrian president grants citizenship to Kurds,” The Telegraph, April 7, 2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8435041/Syrian-president-grants-citizenship-to-
Kurds.html. 
11 McHugo, Syria. 
 formation of a political body called the Syrian National Council, which met in Istanbul, Turkey. 
In 2012, fighting spread to Aleppo, the commercial center of Syria and its second-largest city. 
By July 2012, the initial protests – which were largely peripheral, organized by people of 
the lower and middle classes, and mostly fueled by local grievances – had turned into a brutal 
civil war, fought between the Syrian government forces and multiple rebel factions, including 
both secular and Islamist groups.12 In March 2013, Islamist rebel forces took control of Raqqa, 
making it the first major city to come under insurgent control in the civil war. Around this time, 
the regime also started to withdraw its forces from eastern Syria. The war entered a new phase in 
June 2014, when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) captured the Iraqi city of Mosul and 
declared an Islamic caliphate with the Syrian city of Raqqa as its de facto capital. After ISIS 
started to attack Kurdish forces dominated by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in northern 
Syria, Kurds became a fourth major player in the war.13 
In summer 2014, while the government was in control of Damascus and the coastal cities 
of Latakia, Baniyas, and Tartous, the city of Aleppo was divided between government and 
opposition groups. To the east of the Euphrates River, the regime had no forces present, and the 
Syrian Kurds and various Islamist groups battled for control. In March 2015, the city of Idlib was 
captured by Islamist rebel groups, and ISIS captured the desert city of Palmyra in May 2015. 
These losses forced Assad to concede that the Syrian Army faced a manpower shortage.14 In the 
fall of 2015, Russia, a staunch supporter of the Assad regime, started its first air strikes from 
Khmeimim Air Base, near Latakia, to bolster regime control. These strikes aimed at both ISIS 
and non-ISIS opposition groups, bombing targets in Homs, Hama, and Quneitra provinces.15 
Russian intervention had reset the military balance in Syria by early 2016,16 and the Assad 
regime gained ground throughout the year. Around this time, the war also had clearly become a 
proxy conflict between actors supporting the regime (Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah) and those 
supporting the opposition (the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar). At the end of 
2016, the regime recaptured the entire city of Aleppo.17  
As a result of the violence, millions of Syrian civilians fled to Turkey, as well as Jordan, 
Lebanon, Iraq, and Europe. Although Turkey hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees – it is 
now home to more than 3.5 million18 – their experiences have been understudied when compared 
to refugee experiences in Lebanon, Jordan, and especially Europe. For instance, in a recent issue 
                                                 
12 Ibid.; Alexander De Juan and André Bank, “The Ba’athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political 
violence in the Syrian civil war,” Journal of Peace Research 52, Issue 1 (January 2015): 91-104. 
13 Christopher Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2016). 
14 Maher Samaan and Anne Barnard, “Assad, in Rare Admission, Says Syria’s Army Lacks Manpower,” New York 
Times, July 26, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/world/middleeast/assad-in-rare-admission-says-syrias-
army-lacks-manpower.html. 
15 Philips, The Battle for Syria. 
16 Genevieve Casagrande, Christopher Kozak, and Jennifer Cafarella, “Syria 90-day Forecast: The Assad Regime 
and Allies in Northern Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, last modified on February 24, 2016, 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syria%2090%20Day%20Forecast%2024%20FEB%202016%28
1%29_0.pdf. 
17 “Aleppo battle: Syrian city ‘back under government control,’” BBC News, last modified December 22, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-38408548. 
18 “Temporary Protection,” Directorate General of Migration Management, last modified June 9, 2018, 
http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik. 
 of a prestigious journal devoted to displaced Syrians,19 only a single article out of 27 exclusively 
focuses on Syrians in Turkey. In part, the lack of research reflects the particular nature of 
Turkey’s response to the massive refugee inflows. Although in most refugee crises the response 
is coordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in the case of 
the Syrian crisis the Turkish government has insisted on directly handling the refugee 
registration and management process within its own borders through two state-controlled bodies, 
the Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) and the Directorate 
General of Migration Management (DGMM). AFAD tightly controls access to the refugee 
camps and generally prohibits most researchers from entering. Furthermore, AFAD and DGMM 
also refuse to release any detailed data on the origin areas or settlement patterns of refugees 
entering Turkey.20 Finally, in the spring of 2015, the Interior Ministry announced that academic 
research with Syrian refugee populations in Turkey was subject to the approval of the ministry. 
This approval requirement was lifted by the end of 2015. Taken together, however, these 
regulations and prohibitions have limited researchers’ access to refugee populations. 
Capturing the collective voice of Syrian refugees in Turkey is made more difficult by the 
fact that these individuals are widely dispersed. Currently, only 6 percent of refugees are living 
in camps, while the rest have settled among the general Turkish population. More than half of the 
refugees are living in four provinces of Turkey: Istanbul, Gaziantep, Hatay, and Şanlıurfa.21 We 
therefore conducted our study in those provinces. Although we were not able to ask questions 
about religious sects because the topic was considered too sensitive, our prior fieldwork taught 
us that Syrians residing in Gaziantep are mostly Sunni Arabs, that Syrian Kurds live in Şanlıurfa, 
and that Alawite Syrians are more likely to reside in Hatay. Gaziantep, Hatay, and Şanlıurfa 
share a border with Syria, while Istanbul is far away from the border.  
Within these provinces, we targeted districts that had the highest concentration of 
Syrians, according to information we collected in 2015 during our interviews with 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that assist Syrian refugees. In Gaziantep, we sampled 
Şahinbey and Şehitkamil districts. In Şanlıurfa, we sampled Haliliye and Eyyubiye districts. In 
Hatay, we sampled Antakya. In Istanbul, we sampled in five districts: Bağcılar, Esenler, Fatih, 
Küçükçekmece, and Sultanbeyli. In the next stage, within each neighborhood with a heavy 
concentration of Syrians, our enumerators randomly chose a street and then randomly selected 
households on that street. The enumerators asked if the household was Turkish or Syrian. If the 
household was Turkish, they randomly selected another household on the street; if Syrian, the 
male head of the household was asked to participate in the survey if he was at home.22 If the 
                                                 
19 “Syrians in displacement,” Forced Migration Review, Issue 57, last modified February 2018, 
http://www.fmreview.org/syria2018. 
20 The two exceptions are the reports published by AFAD, the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, in 
2013 and 2017, but they report refugees’ origin in Syria only at the governorate level. See, “Syrian refugees in 
Turkey, 2013: Field Survey Results,” AFAD, 2013, https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/2376/files/61-
2013123015505-syrian-refugees-in-turkey-2013_print_12_11_2013_eng.pdf; “Field Survey on Demographic View, 
Living Conditions and Future Expectations of Syrians in Turkey,” AFAD, 2017, 
https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/25335/xfiles/17b-
Field_Survey_on_Demographic_View_Living_Conditions_and_Future_Expectations_of_Syrians_in_Turkey_2017_
English_1.pdf 
21According to the figures provided by Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), at the time of our 
survey, the numbers of Syrians living in each of these provinces were as follows: Istanbul, 397,456; Şanlıurfa, 
395,823; Hatay, 377,053; Gaziantep, 318,290.   
22 The initial choice of speaking with the male head of the household was motivated by our cultural sensitivity 
concerns based on our prior fieldwork among Syrian refugees in Turkey. 
 male head of the household was not at home, the female head of the household was asked to 
participate; in a rare number of cases, the female head of the household opened the door and was 
then asked to participate. If the respondent agreed to participate, the enumerators proceeded to 
the survey. Having completed at most 10 interviews per street, our enumerators randomly picked 
another street and completed the next round of interviews using the same sampling procedure. 
In our work, we recorded the opinions of people ranging from 18 to over 70 years old, 
with a roughly equal mix of men and women. Some 67 percent of the refugees we interviewed 
hailed from Aleppo, which has been the site of some of the war’s worst fighting and bombing.23 
In addition, roughly 10 percent came from Raqqa, 9 percent from Idlib, 5 percent from 
Damascus, and 1-2 percent from each of Syria’s remaining governorates (Al-Hasakeh, Deir ez-
Zor, Hama, Homs, Lattakia).  
Given that such a large subset of our interviewees came from Aleppo, it is not surprising 
that most (92 percent) fled because they perceived imminent danger to their lives. The extent of 
loss and exposure to violence among the refugees in our sample is sobering. For example, 36 
percent reported that there were individuals killed or injured in their neighborhood because of the 
violence in the civil war, and 16 percent reported that someone in their family had been killed or 
injured because of the war. The main source of these losses among those we interviewed were 
barrel bomb attacks by the Assad regime. In fact, 36 percent of our respondents said that their 
neighborhood had been barrel-bombed. Barrel bombs – improvised explosive devices dropped 
from helicopters – are a particularly horrific weapon. They are typically oil barrels, fuel tanks, or 
gas cylinders packed with explosives, fuels, and pieces of metal like nails and machine parts. 
Medical responders working in Syria informed us that the damage inflicted from a barrel bomb is 
unpredictable within about a 500-meter radius, with some people surviving unscathed, some 
injured to various degrees, and others killed. Of those whose neighborhood had been barrel-
bombed, 67 percent said the bombs had completely destroyed their homes.  
Unsurprisingly, we also found that refugees reported staggering economic status 
reversals. Of the 63 percent who said they were part of the middle class in Syria, almost all said 
they had fallen to lower income groups, with 71 percent saying they were now low income and  
25 percent saying they were now lower-middle income. These findings clearly indicate that our 
respondents have faced trauma on a number of different levels.  
 
Destination Europe? 
 
With this traumatic past, how did the Syrian refugees we interviewed envision their future and 
that of their country? Anyone who has been keeping pace with the news will be aware of the 
media coverage that depicts an insurmountable wave of Syrian refugees clamoring at the gates of 
Europe. The typical depiction is one of refugees being held back by the Turkish regime, with 
some using any means necessary, including harrowing boat trips and long treks, to get into the 
Schengen Area of Europe.24 Our research, however, does not fully support the dominant story 
highlighted by Europe’s populist movements and the media. While some Syrians are clearly 
trying to get to Europe, 90 percent of the people we spoke with said that, ideally, they would like 
to return to Syria as their first choice of where to live. Moreover, when asked about their second 
                                                 
23 “‘Death Everywhere:’ War Crimes and Human Rights Abuses in Aleppo, Syria,” Amnesty International, 2015, 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/embargoed_5_may_aleppo_report_death_everywhere.pdf. 
24 For a recent example, see “On the edge of the EU, refugee flows flood the Evros river,” Deutsche Welle, March 
25, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/on-the-edge-of-the-eu-refugee-flows-flood-the-evros-river/a-43068842. 
 choice, 85 percent mentioned Turkey, while only 10 percent mentioned Europe. These numbers 
strongly suggest that the refugees we spoke to either plan to be back in their home country or 
stay close at the very least. Hence, we conclude that the refugees we surveyed want to be part of 
the future of Syria, making their opinions on postconflict reconciliation all the more important. 
 
Syria Past and Future 
 
Given that Syrian refugees see themselves as ideally returning to their home country, what kind 
of Syria do they hope for? Turning first to the past, the majority of refugees we spoke with still 
showed a commitment to the principles of the initial uprising against Assad in 2011, with 62 
percent saying that, even knowing what they know now, they still would have supported the 
initial protests. When asked what they believe the original motives for the protests were, the 
most common responses were to stand against oppression or tyranny (42 percent); to stand 
against the regime or, specifically, the Assad regime (33 percent); to stand against disorder (8 
percent); to stand for freedom (4 percent); and to stand against corruption (3 percent).  
This persistent belief in the initial goals of the uprising was visible also in our 
respondents’ preferences about hypothetical resolutions to the conflict in Syria. Of those we 
surveyed, 78 percent said they supported the removal of Bashar al-Assad, while only 28 percent 
said they supported a resolution in which all groups reach a settlement with the regime. Although 
the desire for Assad’s removal was strong, the refugees we interviewed showed virtually no 
support whatsoever for changing the administrative structure of Syria: 97 percent said that they 
think Syria should remain a united and unitary state. When asked about what they consider to be 
an ideal resolution to the conflict, only a small fraction – less than 5 percent – preferred partition 
or even a decentralized federal system. Even among the Kurds in our sample, the percentage 
supporting partition or a federal system was very low, only 5 and 11 percent, respectively.  
It is important to note that our respondents’ reported preference to see the Assad regime 
removed from power without compromising the territorial and administrative integrity of the 
Syrian state was also accompanied by a strong desire to bring an end to the fighting. When asked 
if they would agree with a family member who spoke out publicly to call for an end to fighting, 
without specifying what type of peace deal would follow the end of fighting, close to 80 percent 
said they would agree. Our respondents also expressed sympathy toward all civilian groups 
affected by the violence in Syria, no matter which side of the conflict those civilians happened to 
fall on. Of our respondents, 73 percent said they would approve of a member of their community 
helping to provide services and aid to people in both opposition- and regime-held areas. Finally, 
only 8.3 percent of our respondents reported feeling that no peace settlement was acceptable and 
that fighting should continue until an outright victory. 
 
Transitional Justice 
 
Although we found the refugees to be supportive of peace, we also found that war and trauma 
had hardened their attitudes toward “out-groups” and especially towards the perpetrators of 
violence. One piece of evidence to this effect is that most of the refugees we surveyed said they 
would not be willing to live in close proximity to former enemy combatants and their supporters. 
For instance, 92 percent said they would be unwilling to live in a building or neighborhood with 
those who supported ISIS. We also found that 87 percent said they would be unwilling to live in 
a building or neighborhood with those who supported the Assad regime. Most surprising of all – 
 especially in a subsample of refugees who were largely pro-opposition25 – nearly 40 percent 
were even unwilling to live in a building or neighborhood with those who supported other armed 
groups, which included the opposition. This notable distaste for all groups involved directly in 
violence is particularly striking and suggests that our respondents support Assad’s removal 
through peaceful means and hold a particular disdain for those who committed atrocities.  
Indeed, with regard to their attitudes toward the perpetrators of violence, the Syrians we 
interviewed were not particularly compromising. Of our respondents, 98 percent said that they 
think that members of ISIS, an especially violent group toward civilians who do not support it, 
should be punished. When given different options for punishments, the respondents expressed a 
strong desire for extremely harsh punishment: about 50 percent of our respondents said that they 
want ISIS fighters to be executed. Also consistent with this interpretation is the fact that when 
asked about the appropriate punishment for opposition fighters who killed civilians, close to 40 
percent of our respondents picked execution – a very high number in our predominantly pro-
opposition sample. An overwhelming majority of Syrians in our study, about 97 percent, also 
said that they want regime members and individuals who fought for the regime to be punished. 
The desire for inflicting harsh punishment on individuals who have fought for the regime was, 
interestingly, much weaker, however, with only about 20 percent of our respondents citing 
execution as the appropriate punishment. It is notable that twice as many of our respondents 
supported the execution of regime fighters as those who supported execution of regime members, 
suggesting that many of our respondents distinguish between those involved in violence directly 
and those tacitly associated with certain forms of it.  
What is more, descriptive evidence from our survey suggests that nationalist sentiments 
seem to have a significant effect on refugees’ attitudes about what should happen to individuals 
affiliated with the regime. The majority of our respondents (53 percent) thought the appropriate 
punishment for regime members would be trial by the Syrian national courts. As for the 
punishment of regime fighters, the most common response (42 percent) was again trial by Syrian 
national courts. Another segment (33 percent) considered trial by Syrian national courts as the 
appropriate punishment for opposition members who killed civilians. When it comes to ISIS, 
support for trial by Syrian national courts fell to 25 percent. As the Syrians we interviewed told 
us, one potential explanation for this variation in preferences regarding trial in national courts 
across groups is that some parts of the opposition in general, and ISIS in particular, are not 
considered to be homegrown and “Syrian.”26  
In short, perpetrators of violence, no matter which side they fought for, and especially 
those who harmed civilians, drew particularly strong feelings of vengeance and a desire for harsh 
                                                 
25 When asked an open-ended question about which party to the conflict most closely represented them, 71 percent 
said the opposition. 
26 The rest of the responses on the appropriate punishments for regime members were trial by an international court 
(12 percent), they will get their own punishment (9 percent), trial by Syrian local administration councils (9 
percent), serving time in jail (4 percent), and admitting their actions and seeking forgiveness from those they harmed 
(1 percent). For the regime fighters, the distribution of preferences was very similar to those for regime members; 
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actions and seeking forgiveness from those they harmed (1 percent), and serving time in jail (less than 1 percent). 
For opposition members who killed civilians, the numbers were as follows: trial by an international court (10 
percent), they will get their own punishment (8 percent), trial by Syrian local administration councils (3 percent), 
admitting their actions and seeking forgiveness from those they harmed (4 percent), and serving time in jail (3 
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 punishments from our respondents. However, this desire for punishment did not come at the 
expense of a complete disrespect of due process. Support for trials ranged from 74 percent for 
regime members to 41 percent for members of ISIS. So far, there have been very limited 
attempts, mostly in Europe, to bring the perpetrators to justice.27 Our findings indicate that much 
stronger domestic efforts for justice will be needed to make reconstruction in Syria possible and 
to ease some of the grievances of the refugees traumatized by the violence of the civil war. 
 
Conclusion 
 
All these findings indicate that when Syrians took to the streets in the spring of 2011, they 
wanted a peaceful change in Syria, nothing more, nothing less. Some years later, they still hold 
the same aspirations for their country as they continue to support the initial uprising. It is worth 
noting that these aspirations do not come with a sectarian agenda. In fact, despite the arguments 
in academic and policy circles about ISIS being a Sunni-supported force,28 the refugees in our 
sample had strong grievances toward ISIS and its supporters. The marked desire for a united 
Syria and very low support for partition further testify to the absence of refugees’ sectarian 
intentions. Rather, their aspirations about the future of their country seem to be determined by 
more patriotic and nationalistic motivations.  
Moreover, we can conclude that our respondents’ exposure to vast and horrific forms of 
violence makes them desire peace in Syria more than anything else. Yet their traumatic 
experiences have also hardened their attitudes toward the perpetrators of violence, especially 
violence against civilians. Our respondents wanted to see such individuals punished, and they 
also did not want to be in close proximity to anyone who had been involved in committing 
atrocities. Although the people we interviewed expressed a remarkable level of sympathy toward 
their fellow Syrian civilians, it is hard to imagine them returning to Syria, reintegrating, and 
living comfortably with those responsible for the violence they have suffered. In fact, the armed 
actors who have dominated the multiple failed rounds of peace negotiations are unlikely to ever 
inspire confidence among refugee populations like the one we worked with.  
A variety of institutional solutions have been used in other contexts for the purpose of 
holding the perpetrators of violence and repression legally accountable.29 These include truth 
commissions,30 lustrations processes,31 and collective punishment.32 Whereas much of the 
literature on these transitional justice institutions has looked at their efficacy, we know much less 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., “As Atrocities Mount in Syria, Justice Seems Out of Reach,” New York Times, April 15, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/world/middleeast/syria-bashar-al-assad-evidence.html. For a description of 
efforts in Germany by the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, see, “Here is how German courts 
are planning to prosecute Syrian war crimes,” Washington Post, April 4, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/04/04/heres-how-german-courts-are-planning-to-
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 about the type of justice civilians initially want and how this can vary given their own individual 
experiences during conflict as well as the actions and identity of the accused. Our work thus 
contributes to an emergent body of research focusing on the attitudes of civilians toward armed 
actors33 and transitional justice.34 We believe such research holds the modest promise of 
informing policy interventions aimed at developing viable and sustainable postconflict 
reconciliation processes. 
When it comes to reconciling with the incumbent regime, our findings indicate that 
domestic trials are the refugees’ preferred institutional form of accountability. Domestic trials are 
known to be polarizing and controversial in the aftermath of civil wars. For instance, the gacaca 
trials in Rwanda were criticized as “a state-imposed veneer of reconciliation.”35 In addition, the 
empirical record shows that amnesties have been more common than either trials or truth 
commissions in peace agreements between 1980 and 2006.36 It is not hard to imagine a similar 
outcome in the case of the successful implementation of domestic trials in Syria, especially given 
the fact that Bashar Assad seems to have won the civil war. Nonetheless, if and when refugee 
return becomes possible, addressing this group’s grievances through accountable domestic 
institutions will be imperative to achieving durable peace in Syria.  
Although the Syrian civil war is not necessarily unique in terms of its duration or the  
scale of the violence it has produced, we need to be careful about the generalizability of our 
findings for two reasons, one methodological, the other more theoretical. First, we surveyed 
refugee populations who are currently outside Syria and therefore are relatively secure from the 
warring parties and especially the incumbent regime. Previous research has shown that feelings 
of insecurity can lower the willingness to demand transitional justice.37 Thus, we may have 
found different results with respect to demands for transitional justice if we had surveyed 
internally displaced Syrians who may feel less secure compared to the refugees outside Syria. 
Second, previous research suggests that there may be low levels of public support for 
aggressively punishing the perpetrators of violence, especially if victimized groups gain 
politically in the aftermath of a civil war and are afraid to lose their political gains in pursuit of 
holding perpetrators of violence accountable.38 Since there is little chance that opposition groups 
in Syria will achieve such a political gain, we should expect pro-opposition Syrian refugees’ 
demands for transitional justice to be more unwavering than in other cases.   
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